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ABSTRACT 
 
The traditional forms of public health law were directly largely toward 
communicable disases and other externalities, such as pollution, with 
negative health impacts.  The more modern view treats any health 
issue as one of public health so long as it effects large numbers of 
individuals, which would include such matters as obesity and 
diabetes.  Historically, this paper examines the constitutional evolution 
of the public health principle from the narrower to the broader 
conception.  It then argues that the narrower principle better defines 
the appropriate scope of coercive government intervention than the 
broader definition, which could easily authorize those forms of 
intervention in economic affairs whose indirect effects are likely to 
reduce overall social wealth and freedom, and with it the overall 
health levels of the population.  
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION: OLD AND NEW PUBLIC HEALTH 
Salus Populi Suprema Lex. “The well being of the public is the supreme 
law.” That legal maxim does not represent some ringing endorsement of the 
welfare state in an age technological progress. Rather, that Latin maxim is as old 
as the law itself, with powerful roots (even) in the American political tradition.1 
Taken in isolation it represents the general proposition that individual liberty, 
especially on matters of public health, must be subordinated to the protection of 
the common good, so that the state is justified to use public force to achieve that 
                                                 
1 William J. Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth Century America 
(1996). 
 
 end. In many nations, this maxim has remained a matter of political prudence, 
where it functions as a guide to legislative and administrative decisionmaking. In 
the United States, however, the stakes have been surely raised in light of our 
constitutional structure, with its explicit protection to liberty and property 
against both state and federal regulation: “no person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property without due process of law”2—a command long read to have 
both substantive and procedural dimensions.3  
On its face, this categorical provision does not allow for any regulation 
that trenches on liberty or property. Historically, however, the protection to 
liberty and property has never been read as a legal absolute. Rather, in light of 
the long-standing maxim, the protection of liberty and property as a consti-
tutional matter has always been subject to an implied exception under the so-
called police power. The grand question, in which the disputes over (public) 
health forms a part, is: how far does (or should) this elusive police power extend? 
On the modern view it reaches to any matter of general public interest or 
concern, including health in its broadest signification. The law makes little 
attempt to identify separate headings of the police power, such as public health, 
that operate as limited exceptions to the general presumption in favor of the 
protection of liberty and property. It makes even less attempt to identify any 
category of regulation that lies outside the police power. In contrast, the earlier 
period of our constitutional history—roughly speaking any time before 1937—
did recognize an ample police power, whose extent has been documented in 
William Novak’s book on “The People’s Welfare.”  
To some, the broad use of the police power during the nineteenth century 
has been regarded as the decisive historical refutation of the laissez-faire of some 
                                                 
2 See U.S. Const. Amend. 5 (binding the federal government) and Amend. 14 (binding on the 
states).  
3 See, e.g., Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry Co. v Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).  
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 golden period in which the American economy thrived in the absence of any and 
all forms of government regulation. In its place stood the view that the state 
limitations on private power were not instrumental assists to economic 
development, but the creation of “a special sphere of social activity, distinctively 
cognizable as an object of governance.”4 But no careful defender of laissez-faire 
has ever confused property and liberty with anarchy, and all have indeed 
recognized the case for some state regulation under the police power. Even 
though the classical writers on the subject, such as Ernst Freund,5 were reluctant 
to offer any precise definition to the term, the received wisdom confined its 
application to laws and regulations that advanced the public safety, health, 
morals as well as the (catchall) general welfare.6 It becomes therefore critical to 
develop some test which allows one to distinguish whether the nineteenth 
century cases conformed to or deviated from the laissez-faire vision of limited 
government, and if so where. No endless recitation of cases of the state 
regulation of nuisance answers that question, for these regulations are in 
principle consistent with both the broader and narrower conceptions of the 
police power. The acid test must be found elsewhere. Can one find the use of the 
police power to sustain any overtly anticompetitive or protectionist program, 
where the former speaks to a preference to competition in labor markets on the 
domestic front and the latter to open markets across state boundaries.7 So-called 
                                                 
4 See Novak, The People’s Welfare, arguing that Id at 86. In his jacket blurb, Robert Gordon 
writes: [Novak] blasts to pieces the surprisingly hearty myth of laissez-faire, the libertarian 
fantasy that until the twentieth century the American state left private property and economic 
entrepreneurs alone.” 
5 See, e.g., Ernst Freund, The Police Power: Public Policy and Constitutional Right (1904). 
6 See, e.g., Novak, at 13–17, quoting Lewis Hockheimer, Police Power, 44 Central L. J. 158 
(1897): “The police power is the inherent plenary power of a State . . . to prescribe regulations to 
preserve and promote the public safety, health, and morals, and to prohibit all things hurtful to 
the comfort and welfare of society.”  
7 In making this analysis, recall that the foreign commerce clause was drafted with explicit 
protectionist impulses to present a unified front in negotiation with European powers. See The 
Federalist No 11 (Alexander Hamilton) 62-66 (Edward Meade Earle, ed. 1937 ed). But Hamilton 
also envisioned “an unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves of their respective 
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 labor statutes, for example, which regulated the terms and conditions of 
employment contracts would be permissible under the broader definition of a 
well-regulated society, but, given that labor statutes were defined in opposite to 
health and safety statutes, such laws were struck down as outside the scope of 
the police power in the pre-1937 understanding of the subject.8 The same was 
true for rate regulation in ordinary businesses that were not “affected by the 
public interest.”9 Novak’s exhaustive compilation of the nineteenth century uses 
of the police power unduly stresses the admitted scope of the powers while 
ignoring the limitations on them.10 At no point does he list even one regulation 
that goes against ordinary competition or in favor of protectionism. His selective 
vision is as important with respect to public health as with everything else. No 
one questions that public health and safety has long been regarded as a core and 
undisputed application of the police power. But what is needed is an explanation 
of how that power tied in with the more complex constitutional agenda of the 
time. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the shifting understandings of the 
public health head of the police power, as one moves from the traditional to the 
modern account of the topic. On both these matters, a veritable revolution has 
taken place over the past one-hundred years. My broad thesis is that the “old” 
version of the subject, which kept the “public” in public health, and stressed 
matters of communicable diseases and sanitation, is, for all its internal 
complexities, superior to the modern version that regards both the general field, 
and the constitutional power, to cover any and all matters that relate to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
productions, not only for the supply of reciprocal wants at home, but for exportation to foreign 
markets.” Id at 68.  
8 See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (striking down a law that required 
mandatory collective bargaining on the railroads); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1914) (same, 
for state statute). 
9 On which, see infra at   . 
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 distribution of health care and health care services within the Country. In order 
to defend this thesis, Section II outlines the two rival accounts of public health, as 
it applies to both questions of individual rights and matters of federal and state 
power where they play an important, if underappreciated, role. Section III 
examines the parallel question of the use of the phrase public in the time-
honored expression “affected with the public interest,” which was once 
understood to be a restrictive condition on which (under the police power) it was 
possible to regulate the rates that private firms charged in the market place. The 
next two sections examine the parallel evolution of the term public in connection 
with public health. Section IV traces its use in connection with quarantine, 
vaccination and regulation under the morals head of the police power in the 
period before 1937 when, roughly speaking, the use of government power 
conformed to a classical liberal model. Section V then extends that analysis 
forward into the modern period, examining these same heads of liability.  A 
short conclusion follows.  
The central thesis of this paper is that the broad (and meddlesome) 
definitions of public health that are dominant will in all likelihood be conducive 
to the ill-health of the very individuals whom it seeks to protect. The new public 
health frustrates the very ends that it is intended to serve because it lacks focus 
and definition. It extends regulation into areas where it ought not to take place, 
and thus saps the resources and focus to deal with matters, here the spread of 
communicable diseases where regulation is appropriate. This use of 
communicable is not meant to be rigidly exclusive. I would certainly include for 
these purposes the release of pollutants which cause harms to others, including 
those which are responsible for various human diseases and inflictions. The key 
point here is to use a definition of public bads that tracks the idea of public goods 
                                                                                                                                                 
10 For a similar approach, see Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint 
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 in economics, namely, those nonexcludable goods that cannot be given to one 
unless they are also given to another.11 The analogous concept for public bads are 
those which are inflicted on others without their consent, which is the case with 
both communicable diseases and pollution, but not with such matters as obesity 
or genetic diseases.  
In dealing with the definition of public health, it is often tempting to adopt 
the position of “better safe than sorry,” or it is “best to err on the side of safety.”  
But this sword has a two edged-blade, for overregulation is not just a matter of 
dollars and cents, but brings in its wakes negative safety effects as well. The 
point has long been well understood in the area of risk regulation, where the 
“perils of prudence” lead towards the overregulation of remote risks under 
worse-case hypothesis. As Nichols and Zeckhauser argued some time ago, 
overregulation could leave us with more risk rather than less risk.12  
Their target was the regrettable tendency to use unreliable but alarmist 
estimates in areas concededly subject to government regulation, such as cancer 
control But the point is not so limited, and covers any situation where regulation 
in the name of health (or safety) is invoked on erroneous grounds. Just that 
happens with the broad definition of public health. That definition justifies 
interference with contractual arrangements (e.g. for the provisions of vaccines) 
that could save lives while undercutting the control of communicable diseases 
such as AIDS. We do very well today in the United States because our advances 
in knowledge and technology have in large measure dominated the mistakes in 
institutional design. But we can do better, and will do better only if we return to 
the narrower definition of public health. 
                                                                                                                                                 
47–51 (2000),.  
11 See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 
(1965), for the classical account. 
12  Albert L. Nichols and Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Perils of Prudence: How Conservative Risk 
Assessments Distort Risk Regulation, Regulation 13 (Nov. Dec. 1986). 
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II. TWO RIVAL CONCEPTIONS OF PUBLIC HEALTH 
The exact limits of that power have been subject to extensive litigation, but 
public health has always rested at its core. In upholding a compulsory 
vaccination law against smallpox, Justice Harlan put the matter this way in 
Jacobson v. Massachusetts13—a case to which we shall return at length: 
Although this court has refrained from any attempt to define 
the limits of that power, yet it has distinctly recognized the 
authority of a State to enact quarantine laws and ‘health laws of 
every description;’ indeed, all laws that relate to matters completely 
within its territory and which do not by their necessary operation 
affect the people of other States. According to settled principles the 
police power of a State must be held to embrace, at least, such 
reasonable regulations, established directly by legislative 
enactment as will protect the public health and the public safety. 
Gibbons v. Ogden, [22 U.S. 1 (1824)].”14 
Harlan’s formulation covers two distinct features that play essential roles 
in American constitutional history. One theme, of secondary importance in this 
context, articulates the division of authority between the state and national 
governments in public health regulation. Harlan’s citation to Gibbons v. Ogden 
brings home the point because it was at the time the leading decision on the 
scope of Congress’s power under the commerce clause—”Congress shall have 
the power . . . to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the several 
                                                 
13 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
14 Id. at 25. The references to jurisdiction may be of little concern to nonlawyers, but they are an 
essential part of the overall story of health care regulation in the United States. The case authority 
cited by Justice Harlan immediately after the quotation was Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 
which was concerned with the delineation of the power of Congress “to regulate commerce . . . 
among the several states. . . “  
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 states and with the Indian tribes.”15 The second, which is our primary focus, 
addresses how far government at either level may regulate on behalf of the 
public health.16 The matter was one of some difficulty because, broad as the 
police power was, it was not, at least 100 years ago, an open sesame that 
legitimated any and all uses of government power that invoked the phrase 
“public health or public safety.”  
On the jurisdictional question, the limitations on federal power alluded to 
in Jacobson have largely been consigned to the dust-bin of history.17 The 
traditional effort to demarcate exclusive spheres of state and federal regulation 
have fallen before an expansive interpretation of commerce. In the hands of Chief 
Justice Marshall, the term commerce received what he regarded as a broad and 
not technical definition. It covered transportation and trade that crossed state 
boundaries. It excluded therefore all commerce and trade that took place solely 
within the confines of one state, and, more importantly, all manufacture and 
agriculture, which were regarded as “local” concerns outside the scope of the 
federal government.18 The distribution of powers left the national government 
without a general police power to deal with these internal matters. Its power 
over public health therefore had to be derived from other (nontrivial) powers 
conferred on it by the Constitution. The power to raise and maintain armed 
forces necessarily gave the national government an important say on public 
                                                 
15 U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. For my detailed analysis of this provision, see, Richard A. 
Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 Va. L. Rev. 1387 (1987).  
16 See, Gibbons, at 205–6 (noting that state quarantine laws were consistent with the commerce 
power); see, for a more emphatic statement of the same point, License Cases,  U.S. (5 How.) 504, 
580–81 (1847). 
17 I ignore for these purposes the recent decisions of the Supreme Court that have struck down 
some federal enactments as falling outside the scope of the commerce clause. See, e.g., United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).  
18 For just one indication that this was the clear understanding of commerce, see The Federalist 
No. 17 (Alexander Hamilton): “  
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 health issues in military contexts.19 Its powers over immigration allowed it to set 
and implement policies that determined which individuals should be admitted 
to the United States and which excluded—on which issues of public health 
played a great role. Finally, its power over transportation and navigation gave it 
some limited power over public health matters. But when all is said and done, 
under the basic constitutional design in place during the formative period of 
public health regulation in the United States, the brunt of the work fell on the 
states. That point was explicitly acknowledged by Chief Justice Marshall in 
Gibbons when he noted that quarantine and inspection laws (designed in part as 
health measures) fell exclusively within the power of the states at the beginning 
or conclusion of the journey.20 
The most contentious question in the earlier period, however, did not 
involve the allocation of power within the federal system, but claims that 
individuals had to deal resist regulation by government at either level. At this 
point, the matter of public health gives rise to the well-known tension between 
individual liberty and the common good. Justice Harlan stated this point forcibly 
as well:  
But the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United 
States to every person within its jurisdiction does not import an 
absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all 
circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold 
restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the 
common good. On any other basis, organized society could not 
exist with safety to its members. Society based on the rule that each 
one is a law unto himself would soon be confronted with disorder 
                                                 
19 See, e.g., An Act Relative To Quarantine, 1 Stat. c. 12, (p.?) 619 (1799); 1 Stat. ch. 31, p. (?) 474, 
which sought to coordinate the execution of the federal power with applicable state laws, 
acknowledged as proper under the police power. See, Novak, at 210.  
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 and anarchy. Real liberty for all could not exist under the operation 
of a principle which recognizes the right of each individual to use 
his own, whether in respect to his person or his property, 
regardless of the injury that may be done to others.21  
The central question, therefore, is to explicate the relationship between 
individual liberty (“real” or otherwise) and the common good as it applies to the 
matter of public health, including the narrow issue raised in Jacobson proper—
when is it appropriate to impose a compulsory vaccination requirement. That 
issue cannot be considered in isolation because that same tension between 
individual liberty and the common good arose in a wide range of context during 
this same period of constitutional history—roughly the years between the end of 
the Civil War and the constitutional crisis of 1937. In dealing with this issue, two 
questions must be addressed. The first of these concerns the proper account for 
public health or indeed any other form of public good, i.e. those concerns that 
trigger the application of the police power. The second is the means-ends 
question of whether, with the proper end established—say the control of 
contagion—the means in question were properly chosen for the end in view.  
On both these issues we can see a powerful transformation from a more to 
a less restrictive view. On the question of public health or common good, the 
original definition—not perfectly, but by and large—was confined to those 
goods, or bads, that raised serious issues of market failure: that is, to situations 
where competitive markets based on strong individual rights of private property 
could not be relied on to achieve anything close to the social optimum. The rival 
view, which gained over this period, simply invokes the idea of the common 
good (or the public interest) to allow state regulation on any matter of business 
or social life that affects a substantial fraction of the community, where the 
                                                                                                                                                 
20 Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 203, 205–6. 
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 allocative outcomes of the competitive marketplace no longer supply a 
normative baseline against which the efficacy and validity of state regulation is 
measured. There is an enormous gulf between these two points of view, both on 
matters of general regulation and public health. On the former, it allows the 
broader view allows for extensive regulation of competitive markets that the 
narrower view limits. On the latter, public health ceases to be concerned only 
with questions of sanitation and communicable diseases, and becomes a vast 
catchall that justifies any government effort to improve the health and overall 
quality of life of its citizens.22  Here it is best to use the language of its defenders 
to state what this conception requires: 
The broad pole of public health defines a very wide scope of 
organized activities, concerned not only with the provision of all 
types of health services, preventive and therapeutic, but also with 
the many other components relevant to the operation of a national 
health system. These involve questions of health behavior and the 
environment as well as the production of resources (personnel and 
facilities), the organization of programs, the development of 
economic support, and the many strategies required to ensure 
equity and quality in the distribution of health services.23 
In similar fashion, Lawrence Gostin quite consciously entwines old 
functions (which are, rightly, never abandoned, with new ones in his account of 
the scope of public health.  
The mission of public health is broad, encompassing 
systematic efforts to promote physical and mental health and to 
prevent disease, injury and disability. The core functions of public 
                                                                                                                                                 
21 Jacobson, at 28.  
22 Theodore H. Tulchinsky & Elena A. Varavikova, The New Public Health: An Introduction for 
the 21st Century xix (2000) 
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 health agencies are to prevent epidemics, protect against 
environmental, hazards, promote healthy behaviors, respond to 
disasters and assist communities in recovery, and assure the quality 
and accessibility of health care services.24 
In essence the new definition sees public health as all measures to protect 
individual or collective health that are not involved with the treatment of given 
individuals within a medical setting. It includes dealing directly with risks of 
communicable disease, and, of course pollution, but only to the extent that these 
are directly linked to particular pathogens or substances. It may well be that 
some overall improvement in the income or wealth of society will improve 
public health, but these general improvements, of which there have been many, 
are no more closely linked to public health issues than they are to a thousand 
other measures of individual happiness and satisfaction. As Mark Hall has 
emphasized, are goals that are worthy of achieving, but not public health goals 
as such.25 The sections that follow are intended both to explicate and defend the 
old definition of public health against its new competitor. 
III. BUSINESSES “AFFECTED WITH THE PUBLIC INTEREST: 1865–1937  
Let us return to the Justice Harlan’s formulation of the police power in 
Jacobson. Recall that he did not speak of the ability of the state to regulate for 
matters of health generally, but confined its powers to the regulation of public 
health. Was word “public” simply window-dressing, so that all matters of health 
(public or private, as it were) became proper objects for government regulation, 
or did that term identified a limited and proper sphere of government 
regulation? The choice between rival conceptions did not take place in a vacuum, 
but against an extensive legal tradition governing the relationship between 
                                                                                                                                                 
23 Id at xix. 
24 Gostin, Public Health Law, at 16. 
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 private rights and the common good. In its earliest manifestation, the question 
was whether certain forms of property were to be regarded as private or 
common. As early as Justinian, “natural reason” demanded that certain forms of 
property not be reduced to private ownership.26 These included, most 
prominently, the air and the water, with the beach as the marginal case. On the 
private side of the line lay most land, ordinary movables, and wild animals 
whether on land sea, or air. All of these were unowned in the state of nature, but 
could be reduced to private ownership by occupation, in the case of land, by 
taking, in the case of chattels, and, by capture in the case of wild animals. 
The initial set of rules for common property were relatively simple 
because the sole function of the state was to prevent anyone from excluding 
others.27 The situation became, however, more complicated when investment in 
infrastructure needed to widen a waterway or to build a bridge. No longer 
would rules of open access suffice. Someone had to provide the needed capital 
and management. At this point the state had only two options for financing this 
so-called public good—that is a good which has to be supplied to all if it is 
supplied to even one.28 The state could tax and spend, or it could grant an 
exclusive franchise to private firm prepared to make the needed investment. An 
enormous historical debate quickly arose as how best to fund and construct these 
public goods: that is those goods, which when provided to one had to provided 
to all.  
The matter is neatly illustrated by the history of lighthouses, often 
described as a pure public good because its beacon provided benefits for all 
                                                                                                                                                 
25 Mark A. Hall, The Scope and Limits of Public Health Law (mss). 
26 See, e.g., Justinian, Institutes, Book II, Title I, pr. 
27 Richard A. Epstein, Principles for a Free Society: Reconciling Individual Liberty with the 
Common Good 254–56 (1998). 
28 See, for the classic account, Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (1965). 
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 users.29 Before the 1830’s these lighthouses were privately owned and operated. 
They collected their fees from landed vessels by relying on British customs office 
with its coercive power over ships. Yet that semi-private system did not last, but 
was replaced by one that financed lighthouses out of public resources. Why the 
shift? In part the answer depends on which deviation from pure market 
institutions creates the fewer distortions. The private lighthouses probably were 
able to extract a monopoly rent for their services, which reduced the level of 
trade. The taxation could contain that risk so long as the political process limits 
the amount of the tax collected to the cost of the service provided. But public 
administration can easily introduce administrative inefficiencies of its own. It is 
an empirical question whether the newer system outperformed the older one. 
This same painful choice between monopoly power and taxation arose 
with other forms of improvements. Typically it was possible to widen the 
channel on a single river, or build a single bridge over the river. Once the state 
chose not to construct the improvement itself, then allowing the franchisee to 
charge, quite literally, what the traffic would bear opens the public to the risk of 
monopoly exploitation.30  The task is then to figure out how to limit the return on 
investment without confiscating the initial investment. Here is not the place to 
discuss the full range of techniques used to accomplish.31 But it is critical to note 
that first the English, and then the American law, spoke of these monopolies as 
businesses “affected with the public interest.” Sir Matthew Hale32 used this 
phrase in the 17th century to explain why the rates charged for individuals who 
operated a public wharf—that is one to which all must come to load and 
                                                 
29 See Ronald Coase, JLE . Coase stressed the ability of private markets to fund public goods, 
but downplayed the use of public power to collect the needed revenues. See also van Zandt, JLE,  
30 For a more detailed discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, Principles for a Free Society: 
Reconciling Individual Liberty with the Common Good 278-318 (1998). 
31 For a discussion, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law: 1836-1937 (1991); 
for a judicial assessment of rate-making, see Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989). 
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 unload—could not charge whatever rates they choose, but must charge rates that 
were only “reasonable and moderate.” Hale supplied the decisive argument in 
Alnutt v. Inglis33 where the state monopoly was a licensed customs house for 
goods bound for export free of local custom duties. Lord Ellenborough held that 
the licensee’s monopoly power justified limitations on rates. 
There is no doubt that the general principle is favored in 
both law and justice, that every man may fix what price he pleases 
upon his own property or the use of it; but if, for a particular 
purpose, the public have a right to resort to his premises and make 
use of them, and he have a monopoly in them for that purpose, if 
he will take the benefit of the monopoly, he must as an equivalent 
perform the duty attached to it on reasonable terms.34 
The principle articulated in this case was carried over to the United States 
in Munn v. Illinois,35 which rejected a constitutional challenge to the maximum 
rates that Illinois set for grain elevators that operated along-side the railroad 
tracks on the grounds that they were “affected with the public interest.” Justice 
Waite quoted extensively from both Hale and Alnutt36, including Hale’s 
reference to legal monopoly. Chief Justice Waite alluded to some agreement 
among the grain operators, but stopped short of calling this “virtual monopoly” 
a cartel, only to conclude that any remedy for the operators lay at the polls and 
not with the court.37 Justice Field, a consistent libertarian, issued a stinging 
dissent to the effect that if grain elevators were affected with the public interest, 
                                                                                                                                                 
32 Matthew Hale, De Portibus Mari (Concerning the Gates to the Sea), published posthumously 
in the 1780s. 
33 12 East 525, 104 Eng. Rep. 206 (K.B. 1810). 
34 Id. at 538, 104 Eng. Rep. 210 (?)–11, 
35 94 U.S. 113 (1876). 
36 94 U.S. at 125–28. 
37 Id at 131,  
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 then so was every other business.38 But all the while he remained eerily quiet on 
the issue of monopoly lurking in the background. 
The following 50 years produced a confused array of decisions of when 
prices or rates could be regulated for firms affected with the public interest, 
subject to a constraint against confiscation. Public utilities were always in the mix 
because of their monopoly power.39 Eventually the entire edifice crumbled, as the 
Supreme Court slowly separated the test of “affected with the public interest” 
from the existence of legal (or natural) monopolies. Here it is sufficient to 
mention two landmarks along the way. First, German Alliance Insurance Co. v. 
Kansas40 sustained rate regulation in the competitive fire insurance industry, 
without so much of a hint of industry-wide collusion. A generation later, Nebbia 
v. New York41 rejected the tests altogether by upholding New York’s minimum 
prices for milk on the ground that the diary industry, like every major business, 
was affected with the public interest.42 Nebbia transformed a concept initially 
designed to limit monopoly power into one that propped up state-sponsored 
cartels, in part on the dubious public health ground that higher costs offered 
protection against contamination and spoilage.43 Nebbia led to an increase in 
                                                 
38 94 U.S. at  . “There is hardly an enterprise or business engaging the attention and labor of 
any considerable portion of the community, in which the public has not an interest in the sense in 
which that term is used by the court in its opinion; . . .”  
39 See Walton Hamilton, Affectation with the Public Interest, 39 Yale L. J. 1089 (1930).  
40 233 U.S. 389 (1914). “Indeed, it may be enough to say, without stating other effects of 
insurance, that a large part of the country’s wealth, subject to uncertainty of loss through fire, is 
protected by insurance. This demonstrates the interest of the public in it . . .” Id. at 413. 
41 291 U.S. 502 (1934).  
42 Nebbia at 531–32: “We may as well say at once that the dairy industry is not, in the accepted 
sense of the phrase, a public utility. We think the appellant is also right in asserting that there is 
in this case no suggestion of any monopoly or monopolistic practice. It goes without saying that 
those engaged in the business are in no way dependent upon public grants or franchises for the 
privilege of conducting their activities. But if, as must be conceded, the industry is subject to 
regulation in the public interest, what constitutional principle bars the state from correcting 
existing maladjustments by legislation touching prices? We think there is no such principle.  
43 Nebbia, at 516. 
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 price and a reduction in supply of milk, with serious negative health 
consequences.  
Yet the Supreme Court had not wholly lost its ability to differentiate 
between competition and monopoly. One year after Nebbia sustained New 
York’s price fixing scheme for New York farmers, Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.44 
used federalism principles to strike down New York’s differential tax on out-of-
state milk, which was intended to eliminate the entire price advantage enjoyed 
by out of state suppliers. The Congress of the United States may impose or 
authorize (misguided) nationwide cartels with impunity because represents 
national, not parochial state interests.45 But when Congress is silent free trade is 
the norm. Under this new logic, private cartels are vigorously punished under 
the antitrust laws, but state-sponsored cartels are insulated from the antitrust 
laws,46 even though their greater durability makes them more dangerous to the 
public at large. The point here is that we can stick the original view of Alnutt that 
rate regulation is the quid pro quo for monopoly power. We do far worse in rate 
regulation with the broad conception of the public interest than we do with the 
narrower one.  
IV. PUBLIC HEALTH REGULATION: 1865–1937 
Why Regulate Here? The public health regulation has been subject to a 
similar conceptual revolution over this same time, only now the key danger that 
triggers regulation is communicable disease, not monopoly. The early public 
health initiatives were tied closely to the control of communicable diseases, i.e. 
                                                 
44 See 294 U.S. 511 (1935). For a modern variation, see West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 
186 (1994), where the Supreme Court invalidated a uniform Massachusetts tax on all milk sold 
within the state regardless of whether it was produced locally or out of state, because tax rebates 
were only to Massachusetts dairy farmers. 
45 See, e.g., Wickard v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).  
46 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), decided the same term as Wickard. 
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 epidemics. Why regulation here, and not with the “epidemics” of the new public 
health law, such as obesity and diabetes. 
The simplest way to approach this question is to ask whether or not a 
system of private rights under a laissez-faire theory could deal with the 
contagion issue.47 The key building blocks of that system are the exclusive right 
that all persons have in their own body and property; the dominance of 
voluntary contract as the means to alter those initial entitlements; and the use of 
tort remedies to protect against harms that one person inflicts against another. 
How might such a system treat the risk of communicable? The only weapons in 
its arsenal are to allow one person to sue a second for damages for harms that 
have occurred, or to seek injunctive relief against threatened harms. Both these 
private remedies are, to put it mildly, inadequate to meet the challenge at hand. 
Start with the question of whether one person could sue another for the 
death or injury attributable to communicable disease. These illnesses stand in 
stark contrast to the ordinary traumatic or sudden injury that has (typically) one 
easily identifiable cause. It is even debatable whether communicable diseases are 
attributable to the actions of any individual. Quite often, disease quickly spreads 
from one person to the next, without any human action (save sneezes) at all. 
Once infections spreads, it becomes quite impossible to determine which person 
or persons was responsible for each case of disease, even today when we possess 
a solid knowledge of the mechanism of disease transmission. These fact 
questions were quite beyond the power of any legal system to resolve by 
piecemeal litigation 300 or even 100 years ago. Even if by some miracle one could 
finger the wrongdoer, what is to be done if he has perished from the plague? 
Injunctions are every bit as bizarre. No longer does one landowner seeks to 
                                                 
47 For the more general statement of my views, see Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: 
Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. Legal Stud. 49 (1979); Richard A. Epstein, 
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 enjoin a flow of stench from a neighbor’s well. Here, quite literally, tens of 
thousands of people are both potential plaintiffs and defendants: just who should 
sue whom, and for what? Either way then public intervention makes sense. If the 
plague is an act of God, then no one is liable. If attributable to one person, no one 
could track them down. Either way, some (but not all) forms of direct regulation 
holds out the possibility of increasing security for all at the expense of liberty. So 
long as each regards himself as the gainer from this massive social exchange, 
who should protest about it in the abstract. 
The massive breakdown in both the theory and practice of private rights 
makes public remedies instantly attractive even to people who have not gone 
through any formal drill. In the easiest cases, moreover, these public health 
remedies will not conflict with any conception of individual rights. Thus it is 
hard to conjure up any civil liberties objections to one of the great public health 
triumphs of the nineteenth century, when John Snow discovered that the source 
of cholera lay in the contaminated waters pumped from the Thames below 
London’s Broad Street station. Moving the water pipes upriver the pollution is 
the kind of sensible self-help measure that only a madman would protest.48 The 
near 90 percent reduction in deaths (from 317 per 10,000 homes to 37 per 10,000 
homes) supplies the only cost/benefit analysis any one needs. Likewise only a 
knave would protest in principle the use of public funds, raised by taxes, to 
support a system of public drainage and sewers, including the London rivers and 
the waterworks involved in Snow’s cholera case. The conflict between public 
health and individual lies elsewhere, most notably with quarantine and related 
sanctions, such as the destruction of infected animals and goods, and with 
vaccination statutes. Each area needs more specific discussion. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, chs 8 and 9 (1985) (analysis of the 
police power). 
48 See Tulchinsky & Varavikova, at 25-27, for a brief account of the episode. 
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 Quarantines and Related Sanctions. No one doubts that quarantine was a 
standard health protection measure in the nineteenth century, and before. 
Quarantine measures were common in the American colonies before 
independence.49 The practice of quarantine is, in a sense, almost as old a disease 
itself. As early as 1710, the English adopted a generalized quarantine statute in 
response to the entrance of diseased individuals from the Baltic into England.50 
The ship represented a discrete unit that could be kept from port until it was 
determined administratively all the individuals on it were free from disease. To 
put teeth in the statute, persons who boarded that ship “may be compelled and 
in the case of Resistance may by Force and Violence, be compelled” to return and 
remain on the vessel until the risk had passed, at the expense of the shipowner, 
not the Crown.51  
The narrow focus on quarantine helped design the highly sophisticated 
public health systems that were used during the massive immigration to the 
United States and Canada during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
Then (but not now) one was prepared to keep out immigrants on the ground that 
they supplied cheap labor in competition with domestic workers. But they were 
prepared to keep them out if they suffered from some contagious disease. The 
system therefore called for medical inspections at the docks. Those people found 
infected were not sent home straight-away but were sent to Ellis Island where 
they were given a fair chance to recuperate. If sent home it was, as in the English 
case, at the expense of the carrier, which then had an incentive to only board 
individuals free of infection at the other end. Pier 21 in Halifax, Canada operated 
                                                 
49 See, e.g., Elizabeth C. Tandy, “Local Quarantine and Inoculation for Small pox in the 
American Colonies, 1620-1775, 13 Am. J. of Public Health 204 (1923). 
50 9 Anne, c.2 “An Act to oblige Ships coming from Places infected more effectually to perform 
their Quarentine.” 
51 Id. section IV. 
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 on a similar system. That system did a fine job in reconciling individual liberty 
and public health. It was the lifeline of millions, including my grandparents. 
The use of quarantine is especially important when the fact of infection 
and contagion is known, but little can be done to fight it on a piece meal basis. 
Thus, as a thought experiment, no one would (or should) favor quarantine with 
respect to a communicable disease for which all individuals had perfect 
individual defensive remedies. Indeed in these cases, the disease would be 
eradicated, or at least contained, in a short time in any event. But recall that only 
in the second half of the nineteenth-century that bacteria were understood to be a 
causal agent for the spread of disease. In that uncertain environment, 
overbreadth in the choice of remedy is preferable to underbreadth, from which 
entire communities (and their individual liberties could perish). 
Within the framework of American constitutionalism, quarantine 
necessarily interfered with the ordinary liberty to travel, but the gains to public 
health (i.e. the safety of countless others) so outweighed the losses that it was 
impossible to mount a principled categorical attack against this form of 
regulation. Behind a veil of ignorance, everyone would opt for quarantine when 
no lesser remedy could do the job. The basic laissez-faire account of the police 
power holds: everyone is a net gainer from behind the veil of ignorance of the 
uniform application of quarantine rules. So understood, this view of the police 
power was seamlessly incorporated, as Novak has noted, into the American law 
dealing with the subject.52 The Supreme Court wrote in Railroad Co. v. Husen, 
that “we unhesitatingly admit” that the power covers against the prohibition 
against entrance of people, animals, and goods that carried with it the danger of 
transmitting any contagious or infectious disease.53 That power to exclude 
                                                 
52 See, e.g. Novak, at 204-213 
53 95 U.S. 465, 472 (1877). 
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 carried with it the power to admit subject to regulation and conditions, such as 
the use of reasonable inspection laws.  
The devil, however, lies in the details. The part of the story that Novak did 
not develop are those cases where (purported) quarantines under the police 
power fell before constitutional provisions that dealt with jurisdictional and 
individual rights. Once again the narrow focus on public health sharply 
delineates the issues. In Husen, an 1872 Missouri law prohibited driving or 
conveying Texas, Mexican, and Indian cattle within the state between March 1 
and November 1 of any year. The law also allowed cattle to be transported, 
unloaded, by railroad or steamboat, only if the owners thereof stood liable for 
any disease that the cattle might cause, and, it set up the presumption that cattle 
infection along the route was the cause of that disease. Notwithstanding the 
general recognition that the state police power embraced quarantines, this 
particular regulation was struck down as an invasion of Congress’s exclusive 
right to regulate commerce among the several states because the state measure 
went “beyond what was absolutely necessary for its self-protection.54  (Note the 
absence of any broad communitarian sentiment.) The Court held that the statute 
disrupted the national market by blocking transportation across state lines.  
Husen’s effort to see the right balance was tough, for note the arguments 
on the other side. A statute intended at trade restriction would not have targeted 
only areas in which cattle suffered from Spanish or Texas fever. The real question 
therefore is whether some lesser means could have detected the disease. Here the 
statute exempted cattle that had wintered within the state, presumably because 
they had time to show signs of disease. The big hole in the record was whether 
any border inspection could have detected infected cattle at reasonable cost, and, 
if so, with what reliability. Perhaps a fuller record could have explained why the 
                                                 
54 Id at 472. 
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 eight-month ban was necessary, but for these purposes, the merits of the decision 
are less important that the frame of mind brought to the matter. Although the 
police power was broad, it was by no means unlimited. Quite the opposite its use 
was hemmed in by rival considerations, most notably the maintenance of an 
open and competitive market.  
That same narrow focus strikes down quarantine laws that subjected 
discrete minorities to state-sponsored discrimination. In Jew Ho v. Williamson55 
the purported quarantine applied only to the Chinese quarter of San Francisco. 
Unlike the strictures in the 1710 Quarentine Act, Anglos were permitted to go in 
and out of the quarantined district at will, while the local Chinese, who had 
borne the brunt of many a discriminatory law,56 were required to stay put. The 
older always asked whether the means chosen fit the narrow constitutional end, 
which here they manifestly did not. The Court thus struck down this quarantine 
as a sham that fell outside the scope of the police power.57 
The point can be generalized. So long as the ideals of liberty or 
competition are taken seriously, then the hard question under the police power is 
to deal with cases of mixed motives.  In arguably the most famous case of the 
1865-1937 period, Lochner v. New York58,the Supreme Court by a bare five to 
four majority struck down a statute that limited the maximum work hours for 
employees (but not owners) in some (but not all) types of bakery as an illicit 
“labor” statute that it held not to be a public health measure, even though a few 
years before the Supreme Court had upheld a maximum hours statute for coal 
miners.59 Lochner decision was marked by two dissents with very different 
                                                 
55 103 F.10 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900). 
56 See, e.g. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (discriminatory rules for laundry permits). 
57 See, Jew Ho, 100 Fed. at  . Note that Novak mentions the Chinatown quarantine but does not 
discuss Jew Ho’s invalidation of it. Novak, The People’s Welfare, 215 & 336, note 102. Gostin 
approves of the outcome, Gostin, Public Health Law, at 213.  
58 198 U.S. 45 (1905) 
59 Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898). 
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 implications. Justice Harlan’s ponderous opinion argued that New York’s health 
justifications were bona fide. Justice Holmes’s classic, pithy dissent attacked the 
idea of liberty of contract itself, as the revival of Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social 
Statics. The difference is palpable. Once the issue was a straight labor 
regulation—i.e. whether employers could be forced to bargain with employee 
unions, Harlan switched sides and struck the law down as a labor statute,60 while 
Holmes dissented on the ground that the conception liberty of contract did not 
prevent the state for equalizing bargaining power between the parties61—a 
conception that laissez-faire rejections without hesitation. Today’s embrace of the 
broader government role rejects the view that liberty of contract protects 
individual choice in competitive labor markets, so the Lochner jurisprudence 
quickly collapsed.62 The historical opposition between public health and labor 
statutes was no more.  
At the same time, however, the appeal of competitive federalism in the 
absence of Congressional command has kept the distinction (between 
protectionist legislation and health laws) robust and well in interstate matters. 
Thus it was appropriate on public health grounds to keep out-of-state baitfish 
Maine waters only because of the genuine uncertainty whether these fish carried 
parasites that might prove harmful to native species.63 In contrast the simple 
invocation of the language of quarantine was not sufficient to allow one state to 
keep waste from another state out of its jurisdiction.64 Note too that the 
protectionist peril makes it imperative to keep this inquiry alive, which is why 
the standard free trade agreements under the WTO limit the scope of the health 
exemption to the free trade rule.  
                                                 
60 Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 1 (1908). 
61 Id at   . 
62 See, e.g.  
63 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) 
RAE/Public Health December 2, 2002 24 
 As with the regrettable validation of minimum price levels for dairy 
products, all these cases have public health interests on both sides of the line. A 
system of strong protectionism with dairy products increases the costs of these 
goods and thus would via regulation the health of the citizens who are adversely 
impacted. We cannot use any appeal to public health to worry simply about one 
type of error (letting in harmful goods) while ignoring the second of error 
(keeping out healthful goods). Fortunately, the Supreme Court has reacted with 
appropriate skepticism at local efforts to keep out milk, for example, that has not 
been pasteurized in local facilities, so long as it has been appropriately treated at 
its point of origin.65 Once again the federalism rules keep to a conception that 
should apply to individual rights as well. 
Vaccination. Quarantine is only one public health measure. Vaccination is 
second, which requires somewhat greater medical sophistication. Here the 
practice began with Edward Jenner’s discovery in 1796 that exposure to the mild 
cow pox rendered people immune to small pox.66 For most people at the time, the 
only real question was how to gain access to a vaccine that provided strong 
protection against a deadly killer, so that the issue of compulsion lay far in the 
background. But not in all cases. Recall that the extensive discussion of the police 
power 100 years later in Jacobson arose because one individual at least 
challenged the power of the state to expose him to the small pox vaccine. 
Jacobson’s challenge, moreover, should not be dismissed as fanciful: he claimed 
that in light of his family history and his severe reaction to a prior vaccination, 
that it was unwise for him to submit to a second treatment.67 His lawyer also 
introduced statistical evidence that indicated that the incidence of small pox was 
                                                                                                                                                 
64 Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), relying explicitly on the pro-competitive 
language found in Baldwin v. Seelig. . 
65 Dean Milk v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1950).  
66 See Tulchinsky & Varavikova, at 19–20. 
67 See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at  .  
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 no higher in those state without compulsory vaccination than it was in those 
states with it—doubtless because of a high level of voluntary compliance. He 
thus objected to a categorical order of the Cambridge Board of Health which 
ordered vaccination or revaccination (for those who had not been vaccinated 
after March 1, 1897) of all adults living in the town. The penalty for 
noncompliance with $5.00.  
In response, Justice Harlan did not defend the efficacy of compulsory 
vaccination laws as should, but held that it should defer to the legislature which 
“is the only body which has the power to determine whether the anti-
vaccinationists or the majority of the medical profession are in the right.”68 And it 
was on just this ground—that courts cannot consider individuated evidence—
that the Court sustained the program. “Upon the principle of self-defense, of 
paramount necessity, a community has the right to protect itself against an 
epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its members.” Harlan then duly 
noted the state could quarantine entrants into the United States who might 
ultimately prove to be free of all disease.69 But the analogy is flawed. Harlan’s 
case involves the ex ante uncertainty whether a person does or does not have a 
contagious disease. To make it explicit, assume that the condition is one against 
which other individuals have no known means of self-defense. At this point, the 
correct judgment in the face of uncertainty is to force all individuals to suffer the 
lesser peril of quarantine so as to spare others the probability of death.  
Vaccination was not detention or isolation. Assume for the moment that 
Jacobson could have demonstrated that he, alone of all residents, was likely to 
die from the vaccine, but that the local authorities simply refused to introduce 
any exception into the program. Is that sacrifice still required? Suppose, further, 
                                                 
68 Id. at   . Deference is today the issue under modern administrative law. See Chevron U.S.A. 
v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
69 Id. at S.Ct. 358 
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 that the all other individuals could obtain absolute immunity from small pox by 
taking the vaccine themselves. At this point, the scales seem to tip strongly in the 
opposite direction, for the availability of individual self-help measures undercuts 
the need to use compulsory vaccination for self-defense or public necessity. 
(Indeed it would do the same to quarantine.) Far from controlling contagion, this 
statute now smacks of unwise paternalism that ignores all the private 
information that Jacobson, quite sensibly, regarded as relevant to his choice. On 
this model, the statute that does not substitute a measure of security more 
valuable than the liberty surrendered. The traditional police power logic falters 
when effective self-help removes the public (i.e. communicable) risk from the 
equation. 
But what if the small pox vaccine has partial, but not total effectiveness? 
Now the calculations shift back because self-help measures cannot cut the risk of 
infection to zero. Just think of a simple model in which vaccination reduces the 
risk for all (normal) individuals by 50 percent, without any ill side effects. If the 
likelihood of getting the disease depends on the number of other exposed 
individuals elsewhere in the community, then compulsory vaccination looks like 
a justifiable counter to the classical prisoner’s dilemma game where each person 
stands aloof counting on others to take the vaccine. That coercion could be more 
critical when vaccination carries with it some small risk, say 1 percent, of harmful 
consequences. In this case, the uniform rule might well make all individuals 
better off with universal coverage than they would be with no coverage at all. Yet 
even here the calculations must be more nuanced. If one could say with certainty 
that the disease could not spread even if five percent of the population were not 
vaccinated, should a lottery system be used to exempt some? Should those of 
special risks be given preferred exemptions? Should people be allowed to bid for 
exemptions? 
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 The early cases do not deal with any of these complications, but for small 
pox it appears as though the vaccine had less than perfect effectiveness. Justice 
Harlan quotes statistics from the 1870–71 epidemic in Chemitz where the 
incidence of small pox is far lower among the vaccinated population than it is 
among the nonvaccinated population.70 Yet these numbers could be questioned: 
some vaccinated people could have been previously exposed to the disease, for 
example. But even so, the interdependence of fortunes between those who were 
vaccinated, and those who were not, seems clear enough. If more unvaccinated 
individuals had received the vaccine, the mortality rate in the vaccinated 
population would have declined. Yet even this proposition does not justify 
compulsory vaccination until it is known why the substantial minority of the 
population was left unvaccinated. One possibility is their own ignorance, with 
the fatal consequences that it carried. But yet another is that there were 
insufficient supplies of the vaccine to go around. If so, then perhaps state 
compulsion should be redirected to taxpayers who should be required to fund 
vaccination for the vaccine to the poorest segments of the population, both for 
their protection and its own. If, it turns out, that ignorance has led people to 
refuse injections that could save their lives, then it is tempting to endorse a 
dollop of paternalism, for individuals killed by infection cannot learn from their 
mistakes, even if others might. 
Nor do these larger statistics do not necessarily deal with Jacobson’s case, 
for his claim is that he is better off without the vaccine than he is with it, for in 
the former case he is certain to be subject to serious disabilities, which in the 
latter case are only possible. But note the final twist: he escaped his unwanted 
                                                 
70 “At this time in the town there were 64,255 inhabitants, of whom 53, 891 or 83.97 percent., 
were vaccinated, 5712, or 8.89 percent, were unvaccinated, and 4,652, or 7.24 percent., had the 
small pox before. Of those vaccinated, 953, or 1.77 percent became affected with smallpox, and of 
the uninocculated 2,643, or 46.3 percent. had the disease. In the vaccinated the mortality fro the 
disease was 0.73 percent, and in the unprotected it was 9.16 percent.  
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 fate by paying a $5.00 fine, which places the term “compulsory” in quotation 
marks. It is not as though Jacobson had been vaccinated against his will. 
So just how strong is the case for compulsory vaccination? Most 
obviously, sham vaccination programs, like sham quarantines, did not come 
within the police power. In the companion case to Jew Ho, Wong Wai v 
Williamson,71 the applicable public health ordinance required vaccination of 
Chinese against the bubonic plague before leaving the city. Once again the 
ordinance was struck down because it did not apply to the full population. Other 
situations were of course more complex. In Zucht v. King,72 the Supreme Court 
unanimously sustained against constitutional challenge a statute that required all 
children be vaccinated before being allowed to attend either public or private 
school—which is a lot steeper than a $5.00 fine. For procedural reasons, Justice 
Brandeis’s decision only addressed the facial validity of the statute. It did not 
consider any challenges based on the invidious administration of the statute. It 
just treated Jacobson as dispositive, notwithstanding the raised stakes. But 
should the state be able to require vaccination in the absence of any particular 
threat of a given disease? What kinds of individuating conditions could defeat 
the application of the statute? Why should the state has the power to ban 
children from attending private schools, capable of setting their own admissions 
rules, when the risk of infection or contagion is at least as great at beaches, movie 
theaters and shopping malls? We should be more uneasy about the use of these 
programs than we perhaps we were when Zucht itself was decided. 
Morals. In order to complete the picture of the pre-1937 law on public 
health, it is necessary to address briefly on the “morals” head the police power73 
                                                 
71 103 F. 1 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900) 
72 260 U.S. 174 (1922).  
73 For its inclusion, see Hockheimer, supra note 6;  
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 that covers areas which count as, broadly speaking, “sinful.”74 Thus the standard 
protection given to freedom of action and voluntary exchange did not carry over 
to such activities as gambling, idleness, and animal abuse. Nor did they protect 
much sexual conduct outside of marriage, including prostitution, fornication, 
adultery, homosexuality, sodomy, bestiality, bigamy, polygamy and incest.75 The 
laws in question not only targeted individual practices, but it also shut down as 
public nuisances the saloons and bawdy houses used to organize these activities, 
and thereby decreased their frequency.76  
As applied to sexual conduct outside of marriage, these rules were 
motivated in part by concerns with health and safety, but in equal, if not greater 
measure, by religious denunciations of these practices, independent of their 
public health consequences. So understood, much morals regulation seems 
almost bizarre today: idleness was a form of immorality that justified shutting 
down of a bowling alley.77 Lotteries were (and are) terrible, unless operated by 
the state.78 But whatever the odd motivation, egregious overbreadth and unruly 
composition of morals cases, one side consequence of their enforcement was to 
reduce sexually transmitted disease even in the absence of specific knowledge of 
the mechanism of its transmission. The morals head of the police power thus 
served as a useful backstop to health and safety in the response to communicable 
diseases.   
By now the bottom line should be clear: the legal system had ample means 
to protect public health from communicable diseases and sanitation hazards. Yet 
at the same time it took steps to insure that public health regulation did 
introduce economic protectionism or the regulation of labor markets—the two 
                                                 
74 For an extensive discussion, see Novak, The People’s Welfare, at 149–89.  
75 Id at 153. 
76 Id. 
77 State v. Haines, 30 Me. 65 (1849) 
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 central foci of the pre-1937 protections of liberty and property. On balance, with 
quibbles here and there, I think that this old balance on public health was the 
correct one even if one does not presume, as does Novak, the special relationship 
between the governors and the governor. The key point here is that the rules 
which limited state regulation were as important for the advancement of public 
health as those which authorized state regulation. I leave it for others to decide 
whether this “old” system of public health should, or should not, be described as 
a laissez-faire system. The more important point is that both sets of choices made 
good social sense. 
V.  THE MODERN PERIOD 
But what of the modern alternative? The parallels to the evolution of 
“businesses affected with the public interest,” are quite close, for in both areas 
the idea of public is unmoored from the economic conception of a 
(nonexcludable) public good so as to embrace any topic of widespread public 
importance. That broader definition in turns opens the field to increased 
regulation, such as mandated minimum prices in the dairy industry that leads to 
a reduction in public health by raising the price of needed dairy products. 
Paradoxically the expanded scope of economic regulation over wages and prices 
post 1937 has been matched a contracted police power over health and morals in 
the face of renewed claims of privacy, religion and intimate sexual conduct. To 
see how this pattern develops, it is useful to go over the three areas discussed in 
the last section, quarantine and related sanctions vaccinations and their public 
morals. 
Quarantine and similar sanctions. Quarantines proper have not used in 
recent years because of our general success in controlling the contagious (e.g. 
                                                                                                                                                 
78 Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1880). (in alienable nature of state police power allows it to 
terminate private lotteries granted state charters).  
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 airborne) diseases to which they are directed. The great scourge of the late 20th 
century in the United States and elsewhere has of course been AIDS, for which 
quarantine is overkill, since the disease is infectious but not contagious.79 In 
addition, once the existence of the disease is established, we can expect some 
natural private responses to slow its spread: individuals will become more 
selective in their choice of sexual partners, for example, and be more willing to 
take vaccines (if such are available) when the perceived risks are high.80 It hardly 
follows, however, that all coercive public health measures are inappropriate 
becomes some private responses are available. The sexual transmission of AIDS 
depends on the frequency of sexual contacts with multiple partners. 
Transmission of disease is more likely in its latent stage, before either the carrier 
or his sexual partner is aware of the condition. In these circumstances, potential 
victims cannot take defensive measures, while infected persons could take 
extensive measures to disguise their condition. In this environment, which 
accurately describes the world of the early 1980s,81 any systemic program that 
slows down that rate of sexual contact will slow down the spread of the disease, 
especially in the early years when the virus is at maximum potency.  
Yet against this backdrop we see a continued effort to downplay the 
compulsory use of police power regulation to deal with the AIDS menace in the 
name of associational freedom. I can recall attending more than one workshop 
where the dominant theme was that AIDS was a medical and not a social 
problem, as if the disease could have ever gained a toehold if everyone were 
                                                 
79 Quarantines are still used today in various settings. See, e.g. Melanie L McCall Comment: 
AIDS Quarantine Law in the International Community: Health and Safety Measures or Human 
Rights Violations?, 15 Loyola-Los Angeles Int’l. & Comp. L. J. 1001 (1993). And for tuberculosis, 
see Rosemary G. Reilly, Combating the Tuberculosis Epidemic: The Legality of Coercive 
Treatment Measures, 27 Colum J. L. & Soc. Probls. 101 (1993) 
80 For discussion of these measures, See, Thomas Philipson, Economic Epidemiology and 
Infectious Diseases, Handbook of Health Economics, Volume 1, 1761– (A.J. Culyer & J.P. 
Newhouse, eds. 2000). 
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 perfectly monogamous. The hard question is what forms of public intervention 
make sense when liberty interests are so clearly implicated.  
Start with the bathhouses, where so much of AIDS spread in the initial 
stages. The traditional police power trinity of safety, health and morals could 
easily justify shutting down these (sinful) operations even without specific proof 
that they facilitate the transmission of a particular disease. But the modern view 
on this subject so magnifies the constitutional rights of intimate association,82 that 
the public health measures can only be justified by clear showing of disease 
transmission— by which time it may well be too late.83  The better approach, it 
appears, is to recognize that the frequent sexual contacts with multiple partners 
are always risky, no matter what the state of medical technology and disease 
awareness. Thus with AIDS it bears noting that one critical boost for this viral 
epidemic was the effective control via antibiotics of the various bacterial 
infections (e.g. syphilis) that might otherwise kill their hosts before the viral 
infections had a chance to spread more widely. It is well known that the use of 
antibiotics always has the unfortunate collateral consequence of hastening the 
mutation of a pathogen into more resistant forms. But it is equally true that the 
effective containment of one type of (bacterial) pathogen opens the door for 
second type of (viral) pathogen that is wholly impervious to the full range of 
current medical treatments. It is harsh, counterproductive and unwise to go after 
individual sexual practices, but the nineteenth century practice of targeting 
institutions that facilitate harmful interactions with adverse third-party health 
                                                                                                                                                 
81 For the career of the notorious Gaetan Dugas, see Randy Shilts, As the Band Played On (198 
). 
82 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (privacy in marriage); Eisenstadt v. 
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)(privacy in intimate relationships). 
83 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) deserves brief comment. By a five to four majority it 
rejected the view that the right of privacy contains a right of intimate association that insulates all 
actions of sodomy from criminal charges. The decision came over the passionate dissent of four 
justices, who lined up squarely behind that claim. See, e.g., Kenneth Karst, The Freedom of 
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 effects does mark out a sensible compromise between our concern with 
individual liberties and the control of infectious diseases. 
A second feature of the new response to AIDS also bears note: the 
invocation of powerful antidiscrimination norms for the benefit of individuals 
infected with AIDS, as regards employment, health insurance and the like. I 
know of no important nineteenth century regulation that ever imposed a duty to 
transact with others outside the common carrier settings. Even in that context the 
carrier was allowed as of right to exclude high-risk (e.g. unruly) customers who 
cost more to service than the norm. The system of rate regulation was designed 
to curb monopoly profits; it was not designed to introduce economic cross-
subsidies between different classes of users. The modern use of the 
antidiscrimination principle has the commendable effect of offering assistance to 
people down on their luck. But it also has the regrettable dynamic effect of 
increasing the likelihood (by lowering the cost) that individuals will engage in 
these risky forms of conduct in the first place. In this regard, the inability of 
private individuals and firms not to deal with persons carrying compromises the 
long-term health of everyone else, both by increasing the expected prevalence of 
the disease and reducing their resources to counter it. When we put together the 
two sides of the equation, we see that direct regulation of health risks has been 
weakened, while the increased regulation of market transactions has been 
strengthened. Both these tendencies undermine public health in the broader 
sense of that term, even if these shortcomings in institutional design are masked 
in part by improvements in science and technology.  
Finally, it is worth mentioning, if only briefly, that the new set of safety 
and health issues often relate to exposes to adverse conditions inside the firm, 
which are now regulated under OSHA, the Occupational Safety and Health Act. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Intimate Association, 89 Yale L.J. 624 (1980). The dissenters have won the war since 1986. 
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 In my view, the first response should be that these risks are also governed by 
contract, and thus do not require government intervention. Historically, that 
position was not adopted in the nineteenth century which routinely sustained 
legislation that overrode contracts on safety or health grounds.84 So much was 
the undisputed premise of Lochner itself. But OSHA carries safety and health 
regulation within the firm to a degree unheard of in an earlier, owing to the 
increased power of surveillance that marks the modern age. But here again there 
are no free lunches. Constant regulation, often on a “worst case” basis, frequently 
does little to protect against the accidents and diseases that do matter, but much 
to divert resources that could be better spent elsewhere.85 Just as with dairy 
products, ill-advised extensions of regulatory power are not simply financial 
issues. They also have a powerful, if negative, effect on health and safety. 
The current responses to the traditional health perils, therefore, have been 
weakened. At the same time, it seems to this outsider as though the entire public 
health establishment is united around the proposition that massive public action 
should be taken to deal with the new “epidemics,” such as obesity and diabetes.86 
Here the indisputable evidence shows that more people, both adult and infants, 
are overweight than before and that changes in diet and increases in exercise 
could go a long way to prevent obesity from undermining individual problem. 
But the use of the term “epidemic” is just the wrong way to think about this 
issue. There are no noncommunicable epidemics. I am not at greater risk for 
obesity because an increasing fraction of my neighbors are obese. Indeed an 
awareness of their perilous situation may spur me onto greater care in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Prosecutions for sodomy will not take place no matter what the constitution requires.  
84 See, e.g., New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1916). 
85 For an early account of the dangers of regulation under the worst case principle, see Richard 
Zeckhauser, Regulation 1986. 
86 See, e.g., Thomas A. Wadden, Gardy D. Foster, Kelly D. Brownell, Obesity: Responding to 
the Global Epidemic, 70 J. Consulting and Clinical Psychology 510 (2002) (noting the positive 
association between obesity and diabetes). 
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 conduct of my own life. The alarms over obesity make good sense if the message 
is that individuals have to worry about their personal health before they get sick, 
and should not think that medical care is a panacea that will bail them out no 
matter how they conduct their personal lives.  
Yet the designation obesity as a public health epidemic is designed to 
signal that state coercion is appropriate, and it is just that connection that is 
missing here. Education and persuasion yes; but these can be supplied by private 
institutions and foundations, without government coercion, and even without 
government guidance and warnings, over what personal health targets should be 
and how they are best achieved. We need not face the specter that official tables 
of ideal weights ignore obvious differences in body type, age, and particular 
medical conditions. Indeed, here as elsewhere, there is good reason to fear that 
the increased levels of guaranteed health care works to undermine overall health 
levels. As with AIDS, the knowledge that one is protected against the adverse 
consequences of his own decisions by unwaivable insurance will increase to 
some uncertain extent the risks that individuals are prepared to tolerate.  
Indeed today the major argument for extensive regulation of individual 
health practices comes from the government’s role as the insurer of (first and) 
last resort, not from the fear of communicable diseases. Private insurers of course 
impose such conditions and can, ideally at least, back their preferences by 
canceling the coverage already provided. Yet the government here has made the 
coverage irrevocable, but has no willingness to impose explicit conditions that 
exclude people for dangerous habits (e.g. skydiving) or charge them differential 
rates for smoking or obesity. The language of epidemic suggest the need for a 
vigorous response akin to that of quarantine. What is probably needed is a 
weakening of the public safety net that induces harmful individual behaviors in 
the first event. 
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 In principle, this attention to personal health prior to medical treatment, 
which is the hallmark of the new public health, is not provide a case for 
government intervention, but only for personal diligence on these matters. The 
issue only becomes one of public concern, paradoxically, once the decision is 
made to supply publicly funded health care to take care of the conditions in 
question. The most dominant characteristic of major public health initiatives, 
such as Medicare and Medicaid, is that they make no effort to tailor premiums to 
perceived risks: smokers under Medicare do not have to pay a stated premium, 
as is often required by private insurers that retain the power to exclude 
individuals from coverage. The upshot of all this is that the risk of cross-subsidy 
introduced by the flat premium structure does supply the state with some 
financial justification to limit personal choices. Yet the daunting administrative 
task of deciding what restrictions to impose, and how to enforce them, has left all 
such efforts stillborn. The current system is one of unconditional government 
cross-subsidy. The safety net granted ex post looks only at one side of the 
problem: the response to illness once it occurs. But it ignores the second side of 
the problem: the increased frequency of adverse conditions. It is worth noting 
that life-expectancy increased more rapidly in the first half of the past century 
than the second. It is quite likely that these increases resulted from some 
combination of public health measures and improved medical treatment. But 
better roads and cars, safer workplaces, better and cheaper food also count in the 
overall figures. When all these are taken into account, my own deep suspicion is 
that the new public health is likely to reduce overall life expectancy.    
Vaccination. The changes of the modern approach are also revealed with 
the full range of issues that surround vaccination programs. The major 
controversy over vaccinations in the pre-1937 period concerned their compulsory 
application. Typically, however, the theoretical issue was overshadowed the 
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 simple fact that most people clamored for vaccines to spare themselves from 
horrible illnesses or death. The twentieth century eradicated small pox and has 
effectively contained the full range of communicable diseases—diphtheria, 
typhoid, yellow fever, and malaria, to name only a few—that were the scourges 
of the nineteenth century. The decline of the bacterial infections has ironically led 
to the rise of viral infections, of which AIDS is of course the most notable. 
Although small pox is the notable exception, the ability of any vaccination 
program to eradicate communicable diseases is, however, remote: the lower the 
perceived prevalence of the disease, the more likely it is that people will avoid 
the vaccine, which then gives the disease the opening to surge through the 
population, at which point vaccination rates increase—until the cycle repeats 
itself.87  
In some cases the problem is still greater because of the genuine difficulty 
in figuring out when an epidemic might well occur. The difficulty is illustrated 
by the Swine Flu fiasco of the mid-1970s.88 Haunted by the specter of the 1918 
pandemic that killed over 20 million people, public health officials used spotty 
evidence to rush into an ill-conceived mass vaccination program for a swine flu 
outbreak that never occurred. The program was not compulsory, but then 
President Ford did what he could to promote the vaccine use, including being 
vaccinated with his family on national television. Vaccines, alas, are not 
foolproof. The swine flu vaccine led to a short-term increase in deaths followed 
by the widespread occurrence of the Guillian-Barré Syndrome, whose 
progressive paralysis results in death in five percent of the cases.  
During the nineteenth century, no crash program of this magnitude could 
have been mounted at all. The legacy of the twentieth century’s improved 
                                                 
87 For a more detailed account, see Philipson, supra at 1768–73.  
88 For a detailed narrative, see Gina Kolata, Flu: The Story of the Great Influence Pandemic of 
1918 and the Search for the Virus That Caused It 121–85 (1999). 
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 infrastructure was a mass of liability suits based on the inadequate warnings 
supplied by the government as part of its program.89 The drug companies were 
well aware of the risk of these suits, and they agreed to manufacture the vaccine 
on a crash basis only after the government took for itself all the risks associated 
with inadequate warnings.90 The set of warnings for a large population that 
contains pregnant women, diabetics, heart disease, senior citizens, and so on is 
not easy to craft to meet the strict standards of modern products liability law. 
Those used were so woeful that the United States in litigation never defended 
their adequacy, but only resisted liability on such issues as causation and 
damages.91  In public health, the perils of moving too rapidly are as great as those 
of moving to slowly. 
Vaccines, of course, are not only used in response to uncertain crises. 
Many vaccines, such as polio vaccines or DPT are clearly indicated in many 
circumstances, and in these cases the expansion of tort liability post-1968 has had 
negative public health implications. Before 1937, no doubt many vaccinations 
caused adverse side-effects, but I am aware of no case that sought recovery for 
the adverse consequences either from the physician or other party who 
administered the vaccine or from the firm that manufactured it. Two 
explanations account for the result. First, paradoxically, it is difficult to persuade 
any jury that human error is responsible for adverse consequences so long as 
technology is primitive. In order to hold some responsible for misconduct, a jury 
has to have conviction that it knows what proper conduct is, and how it would 
have made a difference in the case at hand. As Mark Grady has argued, only 
                                                 
89 See, Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968) (liability for Sabin 
vaccine); Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc. 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974) (same). 
90 See, National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, Pub. Law 94–380, 42 U.S.C. 247b. 
The statute in essence made the government the sole defendant in any direct product liability 
action, with remedies over against the drug suppliers only for breach of contract.  
91 See, e.g., Overton v. United States, 619 F.2d 1299 (8th Cir. 1980); Unthank v. United States, 
732 F.2d 1517 (10th Cir. 1984).. 
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 when death in surgery or from vaccines cease to be commonplace does liability 
increase.92 In addition, when laissez-faire principles had some influence on 
judicial behavior, it was easy to conclude that any vaccinated person had 
assumed the risk of vaccine injury.  
Vaccination risks are, of course, not assumed wily-nilly by rational agents. 
But in many settings the overarching deal made perfectly good sense. If there 
were a one-in-ten chance of perishing from the disease, and a one-in-one 
thousand chance of suffering illness or even death from the vaccine itself, then by 
all means trade in a larger risk for a smaller one, even if you do not receive a 
dime in compensation for any harms that do occur.  
Before the modern period, the sentiment helped shape the substantive 
law. As regards physicians, the usual rule of liability required proof of 
negligence (which in the nineteenth century was closer to gross negligence) to 
establish liability. In an age in which protocols for safe delivery of vaccines are 
hard to establish, this case simply cannot be made out. Suits against the 
manufacturer on the other hand were caught by the doctrine of privity, under 
which “remote” suppliers of goods could not be sued by parties injury from 
them unless they had known of the imminent danger of the product that they 
made.93 The issue of vaccine safety was left to some mix between market forces 
and government regulation. 
The legal situation had changed dramatically by the time the swine flu 
vaccine was prepared.94 Matters of causation were, in principle, at least better 
understood, and the rise of the modern social welfare state had undermined the 
intellectual and emotional appeal of assumption of risk, both in popular thought 
                                                 
92 Mark Grady, Why are People Negligent? Technology, Nondurable Precautions, and the 
Medical Malpractice Explosion, 82 Nw. L.. Rev. 293 (1988). 
93 See for the classical exposition, Huset v. J.I. Case, 120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903). 
94 For a discussion of the evolution, see Richard A. Epstein, Modern Products Liability Law 
(1980). 
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 and legal doctrine. In the previous several years, the courts had extended 
modern product liability theories to allow injured persons to bring suits direct 
against the vaccine manufacturer for its failure to warn of the dangerous side 
effects of the drug. The most obvious objection to many of these cases was that 
the vaccine did not cause the adverse reaction at all. In all likelihood the injured 
person had contracted the disease from nature before the vaccine had been 
administered. No matter. It was all a jury question, with this catch-22 scenario. 
The jury had to decide both the warning and the causation issues. If the vaccine 
did not cause the injury, then a manufacturer would have no duty to warn 
against side-effects that did not ensue. But once a jury was allowed, against the 
odds, to conclude that the vaccine did cause the injury, then by all means it was 
necessary to warn of these side effects. The false perception of the underlying 
medical situation reshaped the associated legal duties. 
The results of this misattribution of harm has led to sharp increases in the 
price of vaccines, and a concomitant reduction in the availability.95 Let a vaccine 
reduce the incidence of death from 1,000 to 50 cases, and the manufacturer does 
not get credit for the 950 lives saved, but is charged a hefty sum for the 50 deaths 
that ensued. Building the cost of insurance for those losses back into the cost of 
the vaccine results in higher prices and shortages, as the legal system reacts as 
though the vaccine supplied had caused 50 deaths and saved no lives.96 The only 
sensible way to respond to these risks is to allow for the vaccines to be 
administered with some protection against open-ended tort liability.97 That could 
be done under in two ways.  
                                                 
95 See Richard Manning, Changing Rules of Tort Law and the Market for Childhood Vaccines, 
37 J. Law & Econ. 247, 248 (1994) (price of DPT vaccine increased by over 2,000 percent, 96 
percent of which goes to litigation costs). 
96 For some of the calculations of net benefit, see Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The 
Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 277 (1985).  
97 See, e.g., Paul Rubin, Tort Reform by Contract 62–63 (1993) Second edition. 
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 First, the manufacturers could receive statutory protection against law 
suits, which on public health grounds trump any common law cause of action. 
That protection against liability could be paired with payment of some limited 
sum of money from a compensation fund for those individuals who are injured 
by the vaccine (assuming again that the causation issues can be resolved). But 
that outcome has never quite been reached. The closest response to the vast 
increase was the National Childhood Vaccine Act of 198698 which developed a 
complex no-fault system of compensation, capped at $250,000, for persons 
injured through vaccines: individuals with certain specific symptoms within 
state time limits were entitled to sue. But the recovery under the Act is only 
elective, such that anyone who chooses to spurn recovery can sue for ordinary 
tort damages. On balance the number of cases that will be resolved under the 
program probably has reduced the overall level of exposure. But the dangers still 
remain: weak cases on liability will be funneled into the no-fault system, while 
the stronger cases under the tort law will remain outside of it. The response is 
halting and incomplete, at best. 
Second, in the absence of statute, the vaccine recipients could be asked to 
waive their right of actions in order to receive the vaccine. That contractual 
waiver could be total, or, again, could be paired with some limited compensation 
for vaccine-induced harms. But the categorical rejection of both assumption of 
risk and freedom of contract has become an unchallenged article of faith in 
modern product liability litigation.99  The now canonical view reads as follows: 
“Disclaimers and limitations of remedies by product sellers or other distributors, 
waivers by product purchasers, and other similar contractual exculpations, oral 
or written, do not bar or reduce otherwise valid product liability claims against 
                                                 
98 citation 
99 See, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960)(rejecting standard product 
warranties). 
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 sellers or other distributors of new products for harm to persons.”100 Why? “It is 
presumed that the ordinary product user or consumer lacks sufficient 
information and bargaining power to execute a fair contractual limitation of 
rights to recover.” Markets never work because they always fail. 
At this point we have come full circle. In my view, the restriction of 
(nineteenth century) principles of freedom of contract has strong adverse effects 
on overall health, by reducing the development and supply of needed vaccines 
and other pharmaceuticals that will be brought to market. Yet the standard 
public health treatises that expound the new public health undertake no 
discussion of the implicit trade-offs raised by this problem. Professor Gostin has 
a cursory summary of the evolution of strict liability of tort in product liability 
cases, but no examination of the specific liability issues that have arisen with 
respect to vaccines. The New Public Health treatise of Tulchinsky and 
Varavikova does not broach the question of tort liability and its relationship to 
freedom of contract at all. But the lesson still remains. The economic principles of 
scarcity have as their legal offshoot the principle of correlative rights and duties. 
No new rights can be created unless new duties are imposed. The issue is 
whether the imposition of tort liability, and the corresponding contraction of 
freedom of contract make sense in light of the dominant tendencies that they 
produce. Measured in lives saved, they do not. 
Public Morals. The discussion of the modern view of public morals is 
implicit in what has already been said. The older view that unregulated sexual 
conduct was a public health risk that justified public coercion has been 
effectively silenced in modern discourse. Today the emphasis is heavily on 
voluntary compliance with various norms in the effort to reduce the spread of 
disease, such that various institutional responses to communicable diseases have 
                                                 
100 Restatement (Third) of Products Liability. § 18. 
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 been weakened when they are most needed: before the identification to the threat 
makes private responses sensible. The trade-offs here are no different from those 
associated with the modern concerns on the trade-off between liberty and 
security in a potential age of (bio)terrorism. Both liberty and regulation should be 
understood as principles designed to achieve overall human satisfaction. The 
glorification of liberty, even for a libertarian, is risky business when the specter of 
infectious diseases looms so large on the horizons. We should not forget the 
concerns of the old public health in the headlong rush to embrace the new. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In one sense the debate over the proper collective response to public 
health offers but one arena in which to test the relative power of the classical 
liberal as opposed to the modern social welfare model of the state. Here too I 
think that the classical model outperforms its rivals. By stressing the importance 
of private wealth creation through private property and voluntary exchange, it 
gives individuals the resources that allow them to take effective individual 
measures to insure and promote their own health. By offering focused 
intervention on matters of communicable disease, it seeks to control externalities 
that private forces cannot resist. The two efforts are not unrelated. The increase 
in private wealth will result in a higher level of taxation to create the social 
infrastructure and environmental control systems needed to contain these public 
health risks in the first place.101  Stated otherwise, these issues have to be 
examined from a comprehensive perspectives that understands the profound 
interactions between public health and private wealth creation. The old public 
health by choosing more focused targets for government intervention, showed a 
greater appreciation for these complex systematic effects.  
                                                 
101 “Once per capita incomes get to abouty $8,000 per year, nations start aggressively improving 
their environments.” James K. Glassman, A Bright Idea in Development WSJ at A12, 9/6/02. 
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